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Abstract: This paper argues that the two boom and bust episodes of the turn of the Century –
the Internet mania and crash of 1990s and the easy liquidity boom and bust of 2000s– are 
two distinct components of a single structural phenomenon. They are essentially the 
equivalent of 1929 developed in two stages, one centred on technological innovation, the 
other on financial innovation. Hence, the frequent references to that crash, to the 1930s and 
to Bretton Woods, are not simple journalistic metaphors for interpreting the “credit crunch” 
and its solution, but rather the intuitive recognition of a fundamental similarity between those 
events and the current ones. The paper holds that such major boom and bust episodes are 
endogenous to the way in which the market economy evolves and assimilates successive 
technological revolutions. It will discuss why it occurred in two bubbles on this occasion; it 
examines the differences and continuities between the two episodes and presents an 
interpretation of their nature and consequences. 
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The economic literature seems to pay less attention to financial bubbles than would be 
warranted by their profound effect on economic growth both during the boom and after the 
bust. There tends to be an implicit agreement that they are a derailment of the market 
mechanism due to external causes. In fact, the Austrian and Chicago schools, but also most 
neoclassical economists, tend to lay the blame on government, be it monetary policy or 
distorting regulation.2 The rational expectations school is more inclined to see such events as 
the intelligent work of the invisible hand, as seen in the literature on rational bubbles.3 By 
contrast, J.K. Galbraith saw them as a recurring loop of delusion built-up by the market 
mechanism, but as fundamentally irrational and due to mass euphoria, herd behaviour and 
greed.4 It was Minsky –following Keynes, and in turn followed by Kindleberger– who saw 
financial crises as a natural consequence of the way debt markets work and advanced the 
financial instability hypothesis.5  
This paper proposes to distinguish major technology bubbles (MTBs) as a special class of 
bubbles that constitute a recurring endogenous phenomenon, caused by the way the market 
economy absorbs successive technological revolutions.6 They are different both in nature and 
consequences from the bubbles induced by excess liquidity from whatever source and from 
the Ponzi finance moments identified by Minsky. They are the result of opportunity pull 
rather than of easy credit push. But they are indeed bubbles. They are moments of 
Galbraithian irrationality, but, at least in terms of prefiguring the future value of some of the 
stocks involved, they also contain an element of rationality.7   
History has given us the ideal laboratory: a major technology bubble –the 1997-2000 Internet 
Mania– followed by the easy liquidity bubble of 2004-07. The fact that they took place in 
rapid succession provides us with clearly comparable and compatible data. Yet it also 
suggests that they are strongly connected and interrelated.  
                                                 
2  Hayek (1933:1939), von Mises (1949:1998) 
3  Blanchard and Watson (1982), Diba and Grossman (1988) 
4  Galbraith (1990:1994) 
5  Minsky (1982), Keynes (1936), Kindleberger (1978:1996) 
6  For a complete development of this interpretation see Perez (2002). A more condensed version is in Perez 
(2007) 
7  See Pastor and Veronesi (2005 and 2004:2006) 
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This paper will argue that the two bubbles of the turn of the century are two stages of the 
same phenomenon. The first section below discusses the endogenous nature and 
consequences of major technology bubbles. The second analyses the reasons for the easy 
liquidity bubble to have followed in the wake of the NASDAQ collapse. In the third and 
fourth parts the two bubbles will be contrasted and compared, distinguishing their differences 
and similarities. Finally, there will be a brief summary of the argument and its implications in 
terms of policy challenges.  
MAJOR TECHNOLOGY BUBBLES AS ENDOGENOUS PHENOMENA  
A major technology bubble (MTB) is not an accidental event. It regularly occurs midway 
along the process of assimilation of each technological revolution. It is the paroxystic 
culmination of twenty or thirty years of market experimentation, centred on new 
breakthrough technologies and spurred by the extraordinary profits produced by them.  
The main objects of speculation are the companies engaged in those technologies. But, as in 
any other bubble, asset inflation takes off when the actors in the financial markets clearly 
switch from seeking dividends to pursuing capital gains, which results in the paper economy 
decoupling from the real one. 
The ensuing collapse not only results in the return to more sensible real values and a 
reconnection with the real economy; it also signals the end of a period when financial capital 
is in control of investment to a period in which control passes over to production capital.  
These long-term pendular swings are as much in the nature of the market economy as the fact 
that economic growth, as Schumpeter held, is driven by technical change. Each technological 
revolution drives a Great Surge of Development8 which takes more than half-a-century for 
yielding its full potential in terms of growth, productivity increases, product range, 
geographic spread and social benefits. The process follows a basic stable sequence: irruption 
of the revolution, two or three decades of a turbulent Installation period ending in a major 
bubble collapse, then a recomposition of the socio-institutional framework that regulates 
finance and sets the conditions for the final Deployment period, a time of more organic 
growth that lasts until maturity and exhaustion are reached, setting the stage for the irruption 
of the next technological revolution.9
Table 1 lists the five surges and the corresponding manias. The first column indicates the year 
of the big bang innovation that embodies the transformation to come (Intel’s microprocessor, 
Ford’s model-T, Carnegie’s Bessemer Steel mill, etc.), and the core country where (and from 
where) the technological revolution spreads with the greatest intensity. The second column 
lists the successive “Ages” identified by the technologies that shape them. Columns 3 and 4 
list the manias or bubbles that culminate the Installation Period and the year and country 
where the collapse takes place. Finally, column 5 lists the successive “Golden Ages” of 
Deployment that have characterized the second half of each surge.  
                                                 
8  The author introduced this term (Perez 2002, pp. 20-21 and Ch. 6) to make a clear break with the notion of 
Kondratiev ‘long waves’, which expects long-term upswings and downswings in economic growth. A great 
surge of development, by contrast, represents the process of propagation of a technological revolution across 
the economy and society. The regularities observed in these surges cannot be reduced to behaviours of 
aggregate economic variables  
9  Perez (2002 and 2007) 
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Table 1  Five great surges of growth and five major technology bubbles  
1. 
BIG-BANG: 
year and  
core country 
2. 
GREAT SURGE 
3. 
MAJOR TECHNOLOGY 
BUBBLE(S) 
in Installation 
4. 
COLLAPSE 
year and 
country 
5. 
Deployment 
1771  
England 
The “Industrial Revolution”  
(mechanisation and water transport) 
Canal mania 1793 
England 
Great British Leap 
1829  
U.K. 
The Age of Steam and  
Iron Railways  
Railway mania 1847 
Great Britain 
Victorian Boom 
1875  
U.K.  
USA and 
Germany 
The Age of Steel  
and Heavy Engineering  
(civil, chemical, electrical  
and naval) 
First globalisation 
Multiple bubbles from build-up 
of world infrastructure  
for global trade in commodities 
(steel railways, steamships, 
ports, telegraph, etc.) financed 
mainly from the City of London 
1890-93 
Argentina 
(Baring crisis), 
Australia, etc. 
Belle Époque 
(Europe) 
Progressive Era 
(USA) 
1908  
USA 
The Age of the Automobile,  
Oil and Petrochemicals 
Roaring twenties 1929 
USA 
Post WWII Boom 
1971  
USA 
The Age of Information  
and Digital communications 
Second Globalisation 
Double bubble:  
Internet mania followed by 
financial boom of the 2000s 
2000  
and 2007-08 
USA 
A sustainable 
global Knowledge 
Society boom? 
 
This form of progress by successive surges and by technological revolutions rather than as 
continuous punctuated change has much more to do with the complexities of the social and 
economic assimilation of change than with the nature of technology itself.10 It is because of 
human resistance to change and organisational inertia in existing institutions that the 
introduction and diffusion of the new technologies and their best practices has to be forced by 
ferocious competition and by the high profit pressures imposed by the stock market.  
The technologies of each revolution take fifty to sixty years fully to deploy (and exhaust) 
their innovation and market potential. By the end, the behavioural patterns of both producers 
and consumers are adapted to that revolution and its best practice paradigm –one could even 
say ‘over-adapted’– and resistance to change is very high. It is the high mobility of finance 
that will then enable the reallocation of available funds from the established and mature 
technologies and industries to the emerging ones. What ensues are two or three turbulent 
decades involving the dismantling of all obstacles posed by the –now inadequate– 
institutional framework while fierce competition tests products and companies in the market 
with many failures along the way.11 From the confrontation between them will emerge the 
novel leaders and the industries that will serve as engines of growth of the economy. At the 
same time, the experience in using the new technologies, especially the new infrastructures, 
will result in a different set of best practice principles for efficiency –a new techno-economic 
paradigm– applicable to all other industries and serving to overcome maturity and increase 
productivity across the whole economy, through more efficient equipment, better 
organisational models and much wider market reach.  
Throughout this early process of Schumpeterian creative destruction,12 of fierce battles of the 
new against the old, there are enough huge successes to induce an atmosphere of excitement 
in the financial world. Technological innovation is swiftly followed by financial innovation. 
                                                 
10  Freeman and Perez (1988) and Freeman and Louçã (2001) 
11  Dosi and Lovallo (1997) 
12  Schumpeter (1911:1962) 
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The world of finance itself is among the pioneers in adopting the new paradigm, especially in 
organization, equipment, transport and communications. It rapidly invents, learns and 
diffuses new ways of providing venture capital, of attracting new investors and new capital to 
the market and of leveraging, handling, hedging and spreading risk.  
Soon there is more capital wanting a piece of the action than projects looking for funds. 
Although further financial innovation widens the opportunities by creating new spaces and 
instruments of speculation, the heart of the process is the confidence in the new technologies 
and their profit making potential. Their high visibility in general and that of the resounding 
successes and the resulting millionaires becomes a magnet to attract investment from all 
quarters. The illusion is that there are high profits to be had with very low risk. This 
misperception has an objective fact at the root: after years of experimentation technological 
uncertainty has been reduced to a minimum. The engineers and entrepreneurs that are 
bringing out the new products know well what is feasible and almost surely achieve what 
they propose. The canal makers could confidently project the connection between any two 
rivers, even crossing over one if necessary, just as today’s software developers know the 
universe of services they can design and provide. Such technological certainty is not 
necessarily matched by market success. Competition intensifies as diffusion advances and 
objective market uncertainty is likely to increase, but the faith in the miracle of technology –
strengthened by the growing capital gains in the stock market– creates an atmosphere of 
“irrational exuberance.” Those are the conditions that lead to the major technology bubble, 
often preceded by several less intense boom and bust episodes.  
Figure 1. Three major technology bubbles as paroxystic culmination of a long process  
of experimentation with new technologies and infrastructures 
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Figure 1 graphs three of the bursts of frenzy centred on the core technologies and 
infrastructures that characterise the major technology booms. The figures do not represent the 
violent increase in stock market prices typical of such bubbles, but rather the number of 
ventures measured in terms of companies or miles approved or in launches in the stock 
market. After the fact it seems astonishing that people could believe that such extreme 
acceleration in the number of companies entering the race, counting on equally exaggerated 
growth in market value could be anything but a process of overinvestment and a bubble 
destined to collapse. Yet every time the notion of a “new economy” seems to take hold, to 
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spread and be held by serious people.13 This is in a sense understandable because 
technological revolutions do revive the economy across the board (after years of stagnation) 
and give a sense of new power for modernising production and life as well as for fantastic 
profit making. In addition, they all seem to experience significant mini-booms, which are 
very alarming at the time.14 However, since the recovery after these sorts of ‘precursor 
bubbles’ is relatively swift, the experience actually serves to strengthen confidence for when 
the real bubble builds up.  
The two defining characteristics of these major technology bubbles are: (a) their 
concentration on the new technologies –especially the new infrastructural networks– and (b) 
their decoupling from the real economy. The latter is typical of all bubbles; the former –in 
terms of a strong bias in investment– is what distinguishes a major technology bubble from 
an ordinary excess liquidity one.  
The concentration on the new technologies 
In 1847, at the peak of the major bubble of the second surge, it is estimated that U.K. 
investment in railways reached 7% of national income and nearly 55% of gross national fixed 
capital formation.15 In the installation years of the third surge, from the 1870s to the 1890s, 
between 30 and 50% of all British investment went overseas, in particular to Argentina, 
Australia, Canada and the US. The proportion that went to transport and utilities in each of 
the main recipient countries was about 45% on average but in some cases surpassed 90%.16  
In the current surge, venture capital alone (which is the modern institutionalised equivalent of 
“friends and family” in earlier surges) amassed funds that grew to as much as 1% of US GDP 
at the peak of the boom. Of these, between 85 and 90% went to projects in information and 
telecommunications technologies (ICT).17 Meanwhile, in the stock market, the concentration 
on ICT was also clear. At the peak of the boom the technology stocks represented as much as 
35% of total market capitalisation, and Internet alone almost 10% (more than a quarter of all 
technology). It was a process of differential asset inflation.  
The major technology bubble of the late 1990s was in fact an over-valuation of new 
technology stocks above and beyond that of other stocks. Figure 2 shows the DJ Technology 
index together with that of the DJ US Total (what used to be the Wilshire 5000, covering all 
stocks listed in the main US markets: NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ). In the three years that 
led to the peak of the boom the rise of more than 60% of the whole stock market was indeed 
impressive. Yet, as shown in the graph, this is largely explained by the intense rise of the 
Technology stocks (300% from 1997 to 2000). At the peak of the bubble, total market 
capitalisation approached US$15 trillion, while the technology stocks soared above US$5 
trillion, or 35% of the total, up from 12% in 1997. 
                                                 
13  See the Report chaired by President Hoover (1929) for the 1920s, Alan Greenspan (cited by Cassidy 2002 
pp. 202-3) and others for the 1990s. Galbraith (1990:1994) sees this as characteristic of all bubbles. 
14  The early boom episodes in the Installation of ICT peaked and collapsed in 1983 and 1987. There was also 
the Asian crisis of 1997 that, though of a different nature, also provided reassurance when overcome. 
15  Mitchell (1964); Deane (1968) 
16  Davis and Gallman (2001) 
17  Gompers and Lerner (2000:2004)  
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Figure 2.  Major technology bubbles involve differential asset inflation biased to the 
 “high tech” stocks – the information technology bubble in the 1990s 
 Dow Jones Market capitalisation indexes 
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Source: Dow Jones  
A similar relationship is found regarding market capitalisation in the 1920s bubble. See figure 
3. Using 1920 as the base year, one can see that the total market in the New York Stock 
Exchange rose 75% including the high tech stocks which were calculated by Eichengreen and 
Mitchener to have risen more than 200% until the crash of1929.18
Figure 3.  The mass production bubble in the 1920s was also concentrated  
on the high tech stocks 
    The “high tech” stocks in the Mass Production Bubble –NYSE 1926-35 
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Source: Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003) for “high tech” and NYSE for total 
                                                 
18  Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003:2004) 
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Indeed, the confidence and concentration in the technology stocks during the boom is also 
shown in the volume of trading. Figure 4 indicates the difference in behaviour between the 
highly specialized NASDAQ, where the amounts traded quadrupled from 1998 to 2000, and 
the more economy wide NYSE, where trading at the peak though with very significant 
growth was only half as much. 
Figure 4. At the boom, the NASDAQ overtook the NYSE in volume of trading 
 Annual value of trading NYSE – NASDAQ 1995-2004 
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Source: NYSE 
The other sector that attracts intense investment during MTB and that offers equally 
extraordinary profits and capital gains is the financial sector itself. ICT and finance together 
represented more than half the IPOs for most of the Installation period of the current surge.19
Decoupling and switch to quick capital gains 
The decoupling of the paper from the real economy during the MTB can be gauged by the 
price/earnings (P/E) ratios and by the relationship between market capitalisation and 
turnover.  
The bubble takes root in the new technology stocks, but then disregards the “fundamentals” 
and uses these stocks as mere objects of price-change speculation (as tulips or gold or 
houses). This is shown by the evolution of the Price/Earning ratios. In contrast with the price 
of stocks, dividends may be small or even non-existent. It is the capital gains made by the 
quick resale of stocks in the booming market that feed the confidence that inflates the bubble 
and creates the atmosphere where short-term speculative operations of multiple sorts 
intensify the process further.  
Using the Shiller historical data series on P/E ratios,20 one can observe the striking similarity 
between the 1929 and the 2000 pre- and post-bubble periods. Figure 5 shows that it is the 
rising stock prices and not the increasing dividends that bring the investors into the stock 
market at these frenzied times.  
                                                 
19  Thomson databases 
20  Shiller (2000:2008)  
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Figure 5. The abandonment of fundamentals: Not earnings but capital gains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Shiller (2000:2008) 
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This excess confidence in the paper economy is much stronger when it involves the new 
technologies. Those sectors are the most likely contributors to the high ratios indicated in 
figure 5. For the 1990s bubble one can again have recourse to the difference between the 
more economy-wide NYSE and the mainly new tech NASDAQ. 
The increase in the P/E ratio was already significant in the case of the New York Stock 
Exchange –reaching almost 30 in 1999– but it went to absurd extremes in the case of 
NASDAQ, where average prices surpassed two hundred times earnings. See figure 6.  
Figure 6. The abandonment of fundamentals 
 is even more intense regarding the new technologies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WFE downloaded 3-3- 2008 
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Just as dividends are disregarded during the MTB,21 the profits from which they would come 
are also ignored. Between 1996 and 2000, profits in the real economy were basically flat. 
There is really very little correlation between the rapid increase in total market capitalisation 
of the US stock exchanges (DJW5000) and the behaviour of profits of the non-financial 
sector, as seen in figure 7. 
Figure 7.  The decoupling of the stock market from the real economy: 
market capitalisation disregards the behaviour of profits 
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But neither dividends nor profits determine the flow of investment to the market under MTB 
conditions. Asset inflation is so intense that, in modern capital markets, it makes sense for 
capital gains to be realized over and over again (or to use existing stocks as collateral for 
further leverage). Preference for liquid assets and quick operations accelerates the circulation 
of money and increases the volume of trading. The annual turnover figure for the peak of the 
1990s bubble was almost twice the value of the whole market. See figure 8. 
                                                 
21  During the railway mania in the 1840s, though, companies without profits did pay dividends out of the new 
capital they attracted in order to keep previous investors in and new investors coming. See Lewin 
(1936:1968) 
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Figure 8.  The intensification of financial activity overtakes 
 asset inflation during the bubble 
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The underlying reality supporting such a high turnover figure is also strongly based on the 
“general opinion” about the ICT sector. In figure 9 we can again observe how the 
intensification of trade during the Internet boom was strongly biased towards the shares of the 
technological revolution, with investors engaging in the purchase and resale of many of the 
same technology stocks (many of which were giving no dividends and yielding no profit). 
Figure 9. Much of the increased bubble activity revolves around the new tech stocks 
 ICT-related issues as percent of the total number, of total market 
capitalisation and total turnover – US stock exchanges 1987-2005  
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In terms of numbers, the ICT-related securities go from 8% of the total in 1987 to 16% in 
2000. With that proportion of companies, ICT reached 35% of total market capitalisation and 
absorbed over 60% of the turnover. That was around US$14 trillion at the peak or more than 
1.4 times that year’s GDP. 
This intense activity in the stock market is multiplied several times by that of the various 
components of the banking system, which can mount multiple lending and investment 
instruments as well as complex operations around the core bubble, thus compounding the 
effects.  
The unwitting role of the MTB 
So that is how the market system revitalises the economy every half century or so. When a set 
of new technologies reaches exhaustion of products, productivity increase and markets (as 
mass production did in the late 1960s and early 1970s), financial capital abandons its old 
clients and joins the new entrepreneurs, giving strong support to technologies that had been in 
gestation for years but limited by the prevailing paradigm.22 The financial success of this 
process leads to the major technology bubble, which not only intensifies the full 
experimentation with the new technologies and the modernisation of most industries, but also 
fosters over-investment in the new infrastructures. These usually need to reach full coverage 
to be effective and thus require high up-front investment and take time to become profitable. 
It is the switch to short-term gains during the bubble that attracts the necessary capital to be 
poured into the infrastructural networks of each revolution.  
When the boom and bust of the major technology bubble mark the end of this Installation 
period, most of the economy has been modernised, ample coverage of the new infrastructure 
is in place and new corporate giants are ready to lead the expansion by taking full advantage 
of the new potential. But by this time, the financial world will have acquired the habit of 
being in control of investment and of getting constant high returns. Quarterly profits will 
have become the main measure and production companies will find themselves forced to 
avoid long term projects and to constantly deliver short term gains. For this reason, the 
Golden Age of more harmonious growth –or Deployment period– that follows in the last two 
or three decades of each surge of development will depend on the capacity of the State to 
restrain the financial casino that typifies the bubble and to hand over power to production 
capital, allowing its longer term horizons to guide investment once more. This has usually 
involved changes in the financial architecture and in the incentive structure of investment. 
On this occasion, such regulatory and institutional changes have had to wait until the collapse 
of a second, much greater and more global boom and bust.  
WHY THE DOUBLE BUBBLE?  
The technological and historical factors 
The recurring sequence discussed above is not to be interpreted mechanically. Each surge is 
shaped by endogenous and exogenous forces. The endogenous forces i.e. those that belong to 
the causal chain that explains the sequence are shaped by the specificity of the technological 
revolution and are always subjected to multiple exogenous factors. The actual historical 
sequences present breaks and overlaps and a great diversity of manifestations. The variety 
applies also to the form taken by the bubble that marks the switch from Installation to 
Deployment. In the third surge there were multiple bubbles in faraway countries, most of 
them funded from the London stock exchange, which led the process of globalisation based 
                                                 
22  Perez (2002) pp. 27-32 
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on the rapid steamships, the transcontinental railways and the transoceanic telegraph lines. 
The fourth surge saw the replacement of the U.K by the U.S.A as core country of what 
became the Age of the automobile and mass production as well as the shift of the most 
dynamic stock exchange from London to New York; the depression that followed was the 
longest and deepest to date. The current fifth surge saw several collapses in different parts of 
the global economy and the boom at the end of Installation in two major episodes. Thus, each 
MTB is unique both because of the characteristics of the new technologies it carries and 
because of the historical conditions that provide the context. 
The main historical factor explaining the rapid revival of the financial casino was the lack of 
the regulation that could have been expected after the collapse of the Internet mania, to 
restrain excess risk and to favour investing in the real economy. In the usual sequence of 
events, the burst of the MTB, the recession, the major losses and the revelations of fraud and 
general misbehaviour in the financial world generate enough popular indignation and put 
sufficient pressure on politicians to establish strict controls. After 2000, though, the pressure 
was not there. The losses were encapsulated in the NASDAQ, which was a stock exchange 
specialising precisely in the new technologies; the recession was not long or deep enough and 
was cut short by the drastic reduction in interest rates and the increase in liquidity that 
followed the 9/11 attack in 2001. In addition, the scandalous revelations were mainly related 
to the real economy rather than to finance. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, etc. led to Sarbanes-
Oxley that was meant to control the management of corporations rather than to supervise the 
financial sector itself. 
Another element of the sequence that was absent after 2000 was the constriction of demand. 
Historically, the recession that follows the bust hurts both consumers and producers. The 
production capacity that is built up during the boom finds a violent contraction in incomes 
which reduces sales and forces personnel reduction with the ensuing vicious spiral. At the 
same time, finance (if it was left with funds to lend) finds no willing and worthy creditors. On 
this occasion, the incorporation of the so-called “second world” to the market economy had 
opened from the early 1990s a fresh and gigantic set of opportunities for investment, sales 
and loans. The countries of the ex-Soviet system and especially China were ready to become 
a “miracle cure”. The intensification of globalisation that followed the NASDAQ collapse not 
only expanded markets in the emerging countries, but also, due to astonishingly low wages, 
increased the real value of salaries in the developed world, thus amplifying demand.  
The export surplus generated in the emerging economies also contributed to overcoming the 
demand restriction. By investing much of that surplus in the advanced economies, especially 
in the USA, the Asian economies fed their own export markets. The significant amount of 
liquidity that became available for easing credit lent more fuel to the housing bubbles that 
had already begun to inflate during the Internet mania. This further increased consumption 
capacity on the back of the growing value of household assets. Hence, the global imbalances 
that can rightly be blamed as the main causes of the bust were also an essential part of the 
feedback loop that generated the boom. 
But by the time lending to “sub-prime” households was expanded to “ninja” extremes, the 
excess liquidity looking for profit opportunities had already found equally risky but 
immediately profitable outlets. Futures, commodities, private capital buyouts, hedge funds, 
derivatives and any amount of synthetic instruments from securitised mortgages (CDOs) to 
mutual hedging, credit default swaps, etc. flooded the markets and turned the financial world 
into a veritable casino. 
All this took place in a context of no regulation and no transparency but especially in a 
financial sector that had already accumulated many years of experience in computerised 
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operations and instantaneous global trading. This is one of the factors feeding the bubble that 
stemmed from the nature of the specific technologies of the surge. The ease with which 
financial “innovations” could be designed, introduced and traded across frontiers accelerated 
the rate at which the whole financial world became opaque and impossible to supervise (even 
by the heads of the banks, let alone the government agencies) and that the new instruments 
seemed trustworthy although no one could rate them accurately. What is more, though 
systemic risk was increasing, as revealed after the bust, it was generally agreed that those 
new instruments were actually spreading and reducing risks and that the unfettered free 
market was delivering unprecedented prosperity. No one wanted to hear the lone warnings, 
even if from knowledgeable sources. Among successful financiers, Stephen Roach, as Chief 
Economist of Morgan Stanley, repeatedly called attention to the dangers of global 
imbalances,23 George Soros warned of a global collapse24 and Warren Buffet called 
derivatives “weapons of mass destruction”.25 Prestigious voices from academia also sounded 
alarm bells: Robert Shiller26 predicted the collapse of the housing bubbles; Nouriel Roubini27 
foretold the catastrophic consequences of the growth of systemic risk. But the optimistic 
excitement was equally shared by the financial “geniuses” and by the governments that were 
basking in the glow of the boom. This had been typical of all major technology bubbles, from 
canal mania to the roaring twenties.28  
Thus, the aftermath of the NASDAQ bust was not a reckoning and recomposition of the game 
board but a revival of the casino with even greater confidence, but this time without the 
experimental role. The stock market was indeed no longer centred on the new technologies. 
Figure 10 shows how the technology stocks remained basically flat after the collapse, while it 
was other components that lifted the stock market during the 2000s. As usual after a bubble, 
it is those objects of speculation that had been at the centre of the boom that are the hardest 
hit and are avoided in the aftermath.  
Figure 10.  The more enduring impact of the bubble collapse  
on the new technology sectors than on the rest 
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23  Roach (2006) 
24  Soros (1998) 
25  Buffet (2002) 
26  Shiller (2005) 
27  See Interview by Robledo (2006)  
28  Galbraith (1990:1994) 
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Nevertheless, globalisation itself was made possible by the Internet. Through it –together 
with computers and software– instantaneous transactions became possible around the clock 
and globally traded financial instruments flooded the market in the following years. A similar 
leap in financial transaction power occurred in the previous globalisation, in the Installation 
of the third surge towards the end of the 19th Century, when transcontinental telegraph and 
the ticker tape vastly increased and accelerated both local and worldwide transactions. 
TWO DIFFERENT BUBBLES:  
From technological to financial innovation 
The two main differences between a major technology bubble (MTB) and an easy liquidity 
bubble (ELB) are the forces that drive them and the chosen objects of speculation. MTBs are 
driven by the existence in the real economy of a clearly visible technological opportunity 
space promising to yield extraordinary profits and thus attracting investment money from 
wherever it can be found. By contrast, ELBs are driven by the availability of abundant cheap 
credit searching for whatever object of speculation is on hand or can be created by financial 
innovation.  
All manias –whether MTBs or ELBs– are fertile ground for financial innovation. Financiers 
are equally creative when confronted with either “idle money” or technological opportunities, 
but the results of their successful talents can be quite different for the economy. Every set of 
new technologies has requirements that can strongly diverge from those of the previous one 
and only if finance accommodates can the new ventures comfortably proliferate. In the third 
surge, Germany gained an advantage over Britain by developing medium sized credits to 
finance the export of electric motors. This was an innovation that supplied credit greater than 
that for trade in consumer products yet smaller than that necessary for the usual capital goods. 
Equally, the booming of venture capital (preceded by the so-called “angels”) gave Silicon 
Valley a huge advantage in the current surge. In fact, new business models and new types of 
instruments have given birth to a proliferation of novel financial companies in all installation 
periods. So it was, during the Internet bubble.  
Figure 11 indicates how, from the 1970s, the number of IPOs in ICT and finance grew apace 
throughout the Installation Period. It was in the years of the MTB that the ICT stocks grew 
phenomenally in numbers. This time it was due to the dot.com craze, but the take-off had 
been equally astonishing in canals and railways as was seen in figure 1 above. 
Number of IPOs in ICT and Finance 
All US stock markets 1971-2006  
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
2400
1971
1975
1976
1980
1981
1985
1986
1990
1991
1995
1996
2000
2001
2006
Nu
mb
er
of
IP
Os
Major 
Technology
Bubble 
Easy 
Liquidity 
Bubble
Figure 11. The MTB also fosters  
the flourishing  
of new companies  
and types of funds  
in the financial sector 
FinanceICT
Nu
mb
er
of
IP
Os 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Thomson 
17 
The interesting pattern in this case is that, after 2000, the IPOs in ICT were reduced to a 
number inferior to that in the 1980s, while the IPOs in finance were equivalent to those in the 
1990s boom. And this does not include the countless private equity firms and hedge funds 
that proliferated outside the stock market in those excess liquidity years. 
This is very different from what happened in the 1920s. Then, the major technology bubble 
encompassed financial innovation and finance-centred speculation together with the 
technology boom. The introduction of consumer credit and the proliferation of investment 
trusts facilitated both the demand for the new technology products and the ‘retail’ 
participation in the stock market and was an important contributor to the boom. In fact, from 
1927 to 1929 the growth in the value of new issues in financial companies outstripped by far 
the rhythm in the rest. Figure 12 estimated from Schumpeter’s data29 shows the explosion in 
new financial stocks that took place in the most intense years of the frenzy of the time. The 
crash wiped out interest and trust in the stock market both for financial and non-financial 
companies. The ensuing paralysis was generalised, except in the utilities (the infrastructure of 
that surge, together with the road system) where investment kept up for a couple of years, 
until the trough in 1933. 
Figure 12.  The late 1920s as a single major technology bubble  
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Another indicator of the difference between the two bubbles is the percentage of all IPOs 
represented by the new technology and financial sectors. In the MTB, ICT represents 
between 40 and 60% of IPOs and is reduced to 20% during the ELB. The figures are almost 
exactly reversed for the shares of the financial IPOs in the two booms. See Figure 13. Yet, it 
is worth noting that the two sectors together continue to represent 40-60% of new launches in 
the market. 
                                                 
29  Schumpeter (1939) p. 878  
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Figure 13.  The 1990s and the 2000s: Different focus on technology or financial shares 
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In terms of market capitalisation there is also a clear bias towards technology stocks in the 
MTB shifting towards financial stocks in the ELB, as shown in Figure 14.  
Figure 14. The 1990s and the 2000s: Differential asset inflation 
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The difference is also visible in the distribution of the trading volume between the NASDAQ 
and the NYSE in the two bubbles. Figure 15 is the updating of figure 4 above to include the 
second boom. Although the NYSE also trades in a certain number of technology stocks, it 
concentrates most of the financial companies and a much wider range of other sectors in 
which, as in commodities or real estate, there was strong bubble-type inflation in the 2000s. 
Figure 15. The 1990s and the 2000s: Change in the weight of new technology shares 
 
Major 
Technology
Bubble 
Easy 
Liquidity 
Bubble
0
5
10
15
20
25
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges 
 
From opportunity pull to easy credit push 
The switch in objects of speculation, reveals a fundamental difference between the drivers of 
the two bubbles. The technology bubble proper was driven by what one could call 
“opportunity pull”, whereas the second set of bubbles was driven by “easy credit push”. In 
the first case it was the excitement about new technology that attracted the money into the 
casino, almost regardless of cost; in the second it was the excitement about abundant easy 
money that pushed investors to get credit and to seek new objects of speculation. As indicated 
before, that can in fact be taken as the basic distinction between major technology bubbles 
and ordinary ones. 
Figure 16 shows that the real interest rates for the whole duration of the MTB were the 
second highest in the three decades of the Installation period, hovering between 6 and 7%. 
The only time when they had been higher (though by not much more than 1.5 percentage 
points) was during the time when Paul Volker as Fed Chairman was fighting stagflation in 
the early 1980s. By contrast, during the easy liquidity bubble of the 2000s the real interest 
rate was the lowest since the 1970s. High real interest rates were also the case in the late 
1920s when brokers’ loans charged very high premia. The fact that investors were willing to 
borrow at such high costs is seen by Rappoport and White as evidence of extraordinarily high 
return expectations.30
                                                 
30  Rappoport and White (1993) 
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Figure 16. The 1990s and the 2000s: Very different real interest rates 
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Source: World Development Indicators for interest rates and Dow Jones for index 
 
As to the monetary expansion, Milton Friedman himself provided us with the series that he 
considered relevant to represent the rhythm of monetary expansion or contraction during and 
after three bubbles: the 1920s and 1990s in the US and the 1980s in Japan (see figure 17). In 
our interpretation, the first two are major technology bubbles and the third is one of those 
mixed bubbles that seem to occur in fast catching up and forging ahead situations (as 
Germany and US in the early 1870s). Friedman’s purpose was to show the success of the 
only post-bubble expansionary policy of the three cases. It is ironic that this success only led 
to another bubble of perhaps greater negative consequences on growth, which he did not live 
to see. 
According to Friedman’s calculations, money stock at the time of the NASDAQ collapse was 
merely 12% more than the average between 1994 and 2000; whereas in 2004 it was 50% 
more than the average.  
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Figure 17. Two rhythms of monetary expansion according to Milton Friedman 
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*Notes: Data are money stock as 
percentage of average for six years 
prior to peak. Dates are chosen to 
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Although it is clear that a boom needs to count on enough liquidity to be able to develop. The 
argument being put forth here is that, in the case of major technology bubbles, opportunity 
pull plays a greater role than low interest rates or monetary expansion. Easy credit, rather 
than being the initial push factor unleashing the technology bubble, would act as a reinforcing 
response to the explosion of opportunities, leading to a positive feedback loop. In the case of 
most other bubbles, easy credit tends to be the initial unleashing mechanism. Thus, the asset 
inflation of the 2004-2007 boom was driven by both low interest rates and abundant liquidity. 
The structural transformation in the economy 
The emphasis given here to the decoupling from the real economy that occurs during bubble 
frenzies should not deter from understanding the whole Installation period as a time of 
profound structural transformation. The new technologies grow from small beginnings to a 
set of new interrelated industries with giant new companies at the helm; some old industries 
wane or disappear, some are replaced but the great majority are rejuvenated with the new 
paradigm; some geographical regions emerge as dynamic growth poles while others diminish 
in importance and the same happens to the ranking of countries. All this is facilitated by an 
emboldened financial sector and it intensifies during the MTB precisely because of 
differential asset inflation in favour of the new technologies. After the collapse the 
transformation continues but with a change of gear. The new giants that survive the bust 
engage in an intense process of restructuring. Mergers and acquisitions, which had usually 
begun during the bubble, mop up the weaker companies that either went bankrupt or are 
struggling to keep afloat. Whatever valuable assets they may have in terms of access to 
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markets or supplies, specific technological advantages, or –as in the case of railways and 
canals– connections that can enhance the coverage and continuity of a major network, 
becomes the reason for the new giants to incorporate them in one way or another. In general, 
the aftermath of the MTBs is a time of industrial restructuring, usually leading to oligopolies, 
in every sector of the economy. It is the resulting new fabric of the economy, with its 
emerging leaders, that will carry the deployment period after recovery from the recession.  
And that is indeed what happened after the NASDAQ collapse, even as the new financial 
bubble was beginning to inflate. Indeed, some of the most important activities that finance 
continued to engage in, as regards the real economy, were precisely M&As, private equity 
buyouts and restructuring, off-shoring as a form of global repositioning of the new giants and 
other such activities, very different from supporting the new entrepreneurs in the hope of a 
multi-million dollar IPO. In fact, this role is being increasingly played by the new giants 
themselves, which are now full of cash. Hence, the aspiration of small new companies has 
been to be taken over by Google or Microsoft or Cisco at prices that have at times resembled 
those of the late 1990s IPOs. 
 
THE UNDERLYING CONTINUITY:  
The exacerbation of the casino from one boom to the next 
Up to now, the discussion has concentrated in showing the differences between the two 
bubbles of the turn of the century. Yet, as suggested at the beginning these two processes 
share fundamental causes and have basic similarities stemming from the ICT base that 
facilitated the behaviour and the specific types of financial instruments and modes of 
operation. In that sense, one could say that the ELB was basically the amplification of some 
of the features of the MTB that allowed finance to decouple from the real economy. The 
whole of the second boom was carried on the back of stretching to the limit the financial 
innovations that had already been introduced during Installation and in the Internet boom 
itself. From the Brady Bonds that securitised the third world debt to face the threat of defaults 
in the 1980s to the collateralised debt obligations that securitised the sub-prime mortgages, 
there is a continuous thread. As there is also continuity between the trust placed in the profit 
making capacity of technology (increasingly based on unrealistic capital gains) and the trust 
that was gradually transferred to the innovations of the financial world.   
In fact, the switch to housing and commodities speculation or to the equivalent of casino 
gambling was not simple and direct as it was in the past, but rather strengthened by 
sophisticated synthetic instruments and supported by ever more refined software 
programmes. This is what helped create an illusion almost as powerful as the technological 
certainty of the Internet boom. The term “masters of the universe”, often quoted to refer to 
the financial geniuses that were supposed to have engineered the unending prosperity of the 
mid-2000s, expresses the way in which they were seen as powerful innovators, spreading risk 
and somehow magically evaporating it in the vast complexity of the financial galaxy. 
Enormous amounts of innovative financial instruments of the derivative and synthetic sort 
were mobilised during the two bubbles, thanks to information technology and global 
communications for seamless transfers and operations. It all began to accelerate during the 
MTB and then continued at a frantic pace during the ELB boom.  
An example of this is the growth of derivatives. Figure 18 shows the notional amounts 
outstanding in interest rate and currency derivatives (which represent the great majority of 
these instruments). To try to understand the size of the staggering figure of US$382 trillion 
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being covered in 2007, one can say that it is the equivalent of seven times the world GDP of 
$54 trillion in that year. And it should be noted that the figure does not include credit default 
swaps or equity swaps which together reached another $72trill according to the same source. 
Thus, what was already an impressive amount in the late 1990s resulted completely dwarfed 
by the astonishing quantities involved in 2007. Yet, the continuity in growth rhythm was 
equally remarkable. Between 1994 and 2000 the notional amounts grew 457% which is 
equivalent to the 452% growth from 2001 to 2007. Similarly, in the last three years of each 
period total growth was 117% and 108% respectively. 
Figure 18. The 1990s and the 2000s:  
Continuity and acceleration in the instruments of casino-type speculation 
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Source: International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
 
The globalisation of financial flows is another trend that was magnified as was the 
possibility, by various means, of generating growing profits while leaving behind investment 
in the real economy. 
24 
Figure 19 shows how the growth of world stock exchanges followed those of the core country 
during the MTB but then took off at a much greater pace during the easy liquidity bubble. 
Between 2002 and 2007, the market value of stocks in the US exchanges grew 100%, while 
that of those in Europe and Asia Pacific almost doubled that rate. Indeed, much of that 
growth in capitalisation accompanied the off-shore movement of global corporations in the 
1990s and its intensification in the wake of the NASDAQ collapse. 
Figure 19.  The intensification of globalisation after the MTB collapse and into the ELB 
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Source: World Federation of Exchanges (Note: data includes only member exchanges of the WFE) 
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The bias towards finance 
Another trend in the first bubble that became amplified in the second was the bias towards 
financial profits. Figure 20 shows how the greater growth of profits in financial corporations 
that was already notable in the 1990s, is even stronger in the 2000s. This slant is further 
reinforced by the fact that many non-financial corporations bought into the financial frenzy 
and increased their purely financial investments, to an extent that an increasing portion of 
their profits came from capital gains or dividends.31  
Figure 20. The intensification of the MTB bias towards financial profits during the ELB 
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Throughout the Installation period, the intense activity of the financial world is likely to 
outpace investment in the real economy. This is especially so in the bubble episodes due to 
the decoupling phenomenon already discussed. Figure 21A shows how in the early bubbles of 
the 1980s and then again in the 1990s there are noticeable bursts of activity when compared 
with real investment. Yet the violent increase that took place in the 2000s strongly suggests 
that the link between paper and real investment in the economy had been broken. 
 
                                                 
31  Krippner (2005) 
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Figure 21.A. The decoupling from the real economy intensified  
from the 1990s to the 2000s 
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This is all the more striking when compared with the post war period, which was the 
Deployment of the mass production surge. In those years, private fixed investment involved 
significantly greater amounts than those in financial flows (much of it probably financed out 
of profits rather than recurring to loans or the stock market). As can be seen in figure 21B, 
investment was 80% greater in 1947 and still about 40% more than financial flows in 1969, 
just before the context changed completely with the irruption of the information revolution, 
the energy crisis and stagflation. 
Fig. 21.B. The contrast with the deployment period of the previous surge: 1947-1974 
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The double bubble and the full consequences 
What came after the Internet bubble collapse was not the restructuring of the real economy 
that tends to occur in the aftermath but a casino revival that only fulfilled part of that task. 
There can be, however, little doubt that this second major bust and its consequences are likely 
to follow the script and facilitate the necessary institutional recomposition to unleash the 
deployment period of the current surge. The massive revelations of irresponsibility, 
incompetence, outright fraud and illegitimate enrichment of many of the actors involved 
make a sufficient indictment of unregulated finance and the unfettered free markets under 
which they operated to create an atmosphere of widespread indignation that puts pressure on 
politicians to act.  
After the meltdown of this second bubble, the actors in the real economy –both producers and 
consumers– see themselves as the direct victims of the false promises of the casino and its 
disastrous consequences. Finance has done its job and overstayed its welcome at the helm of 
investment; it is time for production capital to take over and to fully unleash across the world 
the wealth creating potential already installed. This will require governments to once again 
design appropriate policies and provide the general guidelines.   
Nevertheless, the conditions are not necessarily all set for this change. Several authors have 
pointed out that finance has come to dominate the economy to an extent that could be termed 
‘financialisation’32 and that this constitutes a fundamental change in the market economy. A 
similar process in the third surge at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th Century, led 
Rudolf Hilferding to hold that the fusion of industrial, mercantile and banking interests had 
brought a new stage of “monopolistic finance capitalism” with the State under its control.33 
Yet finance was no longer leading the economy from the 1930s to the 1970s.34 So history 
shows that these processes, however intense, are reversible. And yet, this time the resistance 
can be particularly formidable. 
Indeed the overwhelming power acquired by the financial world in the 2000s and its success 
in managing what appeared to be a never-ending prosperity legitimised its hold on the 
completely free market and its ideology and also allowed its interests (and its leaders) to 
deeply influence the political elite in some of the most advanced countries. Although this 
connection between the financial leaders of the major bubbles and the State has been present 
in each historical case, it would seem that in the third surge and in the current one the 
phenomenon has presented more acute characteristics. One factor could be the globalising 
character of both sets of technologies being installed, which objectively places finance above 
the control of national governments.  
On the other hand, the emerging leaders of the new production capital, the new ICT giants 
that would serve as engines of growth of the world economy and shape the deployment 
period, are yet to recognise and wield their power and influence in the course of events, 
nationally and globally. If in the fourth surge the chief of General Motors could rightly say 
that what was good for GM was good for the US and vice versa; today the global ICT 
companies could say that what is good for them is good for the world economy. Yet they do 
                                                 
32  See Arrighi (1994), Krippner (2005), Dore (2008), van Treeck (2009) 
33  Hilferding (1910:1981) 
34  Soros (2008) describes the atmosphere of the financial world in the US in the late 1960s and early 1970s as 
unimaginative and uninteresting, “banks were considered the stodgiest of institutions” (p. 109). Philippon 
and  Reshef (2009) show how relative wages in the financial world fell far from their peak in the late 1920s 
and rose again throughout the 1980s.  
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not seem to be questioning the leadership of finance or vying for a place at the top. Whatever 
their participation, the outcome will be resolved in the political arena. 
CONCLUSION:  
The special nature of major technology bubbles and the policy challenge  
This paper has argued that not all bubbles are of the same nature. There is a particular type 
that is endogenous to the process by which the economy and society assimilate each great 
surge of technical change. These are the major technology bubbles that tend to occur midway 
along the diffusion path of each technological revolution. The collapse of such bubbles signal 
the need to switch from a period of Installation when the new technologies are tested and 
investment is led by the short term goals of financial capital to a period of Deployment when 
all the conditions are in place to let the longer-term aims of production capital guide 
investment again. This transition usually needs government action to overcome the 
recessionary consequences of the major bubble, to enable the shift from an economy focused 
on paper wealth to one where production, employment and social responsibility tend to 
occupy centre stage, while a competent and responsible financial sector uses its innovative 
power to profit from the success of the real economy. 
It has further been argued that the major technology bubble of the information and 
communications revolution took place in two episodes: the Internet mania of the late 1990s 
ending with the NASDAQ collapse in 2000 and the easy liquidity boom of the mid 2000s 
ending in the financial crisis of 2007-08. The first was based on technological innovation, the 
second on financial innovation, facilitated, accelerated and made global by information 
technology and the Internet. 
There are many circumstances that explain why the first episode was not big enough in its 
consequences to require the type of regulation and policies that would restrain financial 
excesses. There are others that explain the easy liquidity that prevailed in the second episode 
and the global imbalances that intensified it. But the claim is that although the two bubbles 
are fundamentally different, there is also between them an essential continuity that leads to 
expect the typical consequences of major technology bubbles to occur after the collapse of 
the second one. 
It was also suggested here that major technology bubbles are generated by opportunity pull, 
whereas easy liquidity bubbles are the result of easy credit push. The first bring money to the 
market in search of the extraordinary profit opportunities shown by the successes of the new 
technologies; the others look for objects of speculation with which to make the easy money 
yield ever better and quicker returns. The occurrence of a sequence of two very different 
bubbles that are nevertheless continuous in basic aspects allowed the analysis of the 
similarities and differences of the two types of bubble with compatible data. 
Further research is necessary to fully understand the processes by which major technology 
bubbles and easy liquidity bubbles are formed in the market system. Among other things, the 
results would help identify the mechanisms that could avoid the worst excesses and the most 
painful consequences. But the focus cannot be confined to the economic space. Both 
technical and institutional change –including innovation in the financial system and in its 
instruments– would have to be included in the analysis. The institutional response to the 
current collapse of the financial system and to the ensuing recession should also be an 
important part of the objects of study.  
The fundamental implication of the interpretation presented here is that what we are facing is 
not just a financial crisis but rather the end of a period and the need for a structural shift in 
social and economic context to allow for continued growth under this paradigm. Both 
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globalisation and national prosperity will depend upon and be shaped by the long-term 
solutions implemented to face the challenges posed by the current recession. 
The transformation effected by the information and communications revolution during the 
Installation period has already provided the world economy with a gigantic innovation and 
growth potential to be tapped by all sectors of activity and across the planet. The 
environmental, energy, materials and geopolitical restrictions are as many challenges to guide 
technological and organisational innovation contributing to a change in consumption and 
production patterns. Such changes are particularly amenable to the innovation trajectories 
facilitated by ICT. The massive and varied investments required, will open abundant profit 
opportunities while bringing employment and increasing incomes to greater and greater 
portions of the population of all continents. 
The legitimacy of capitalism rests upon its capacity to turn individual quest for profit into 
collective benefits. The pendular swings from Installation to Deployment, from financial to 
production control of investment, from a laissez faire State to an active one, from income 
polarisation to more progressive income distribution and from unlimited individualism to 
emphasis on social responsibility and back might be inevitable in the way a market economy 
evolves. Perhaps the system can only maintain its stability by emphasising one direction or 
the other. In which case, continuing with the laissez faire model would be as much of an 
obstacle to growth now as maintaining the bureaucratic fetters of government would have 
been in the shift to Installation from the 1970s.  
The current generation of political and business leaders has to face the task of reconstituting 
finance and bringing the world out of recession. It is crucial that they widen their lens and 
include in their focus a much greater and loftier task: bringing about the structural shift 
within nations and in the world economy. Civil society through its many new organisations 
and communications networks is likely to have a much greater role to play in the outcome on 
this occasion. Creating favourable conditions for a sustainable global knowledge society is a 
task waiting to be realised. When –or if– it is done we should no longer measure growth and 
prosperity by stock market indices but by real GDP, employment and well-being, and by the 
rate of global growth and reduction of poverty (and violence) across and within countries. 
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